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Arthur Rosett*

CISG Laid Bare: A Lucid Guide
to a Muddy Code

Commentary on the International Sales Law: The 1980 Vienna Sales Convention, edited by C. M. Bianca and M.J. Bonell (Guiffre, Milan, 1987,) xvii,
886 pages.
Counselors, drafters, judges and arbitrators, who now must decide how
to apply and interpret the United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (CISG), will find this book very useful.
By joining CISG as ofJanuary 1, 1988, the United States has committed
itself to a special set of rules that will displace the Uniform Commercial
Code in international transactions. The incentive to adopt this Convention was the claim that CISG will unify the law of sales throughout the
world by breaking off international sales from other sales transactions
and then applying to them a special set of rules. I have argued extensively elsewhere that this innovation is unwise in both of its major
aspects.' It is a mistake to try to divide the law between domestic and
international sales, since this dichotomy is undefinable in a world economy that is increasingly integrated across borders. It is also a mistake to
attempt to "unify" law by agreeing on a formulation of substantive rules
unless one is prepared to coordinate the judicial and social contexts in
which those rules take on meaning. Many of the world's legal systems
now operate quite harmoniously, although they have radically different
statements of legal norms because these rules are interpreted in ways
2
that produce harmonious results in context.
* Professor of Law. University of California, Los Angeles. B.A., 1955; L.L.B.,
1959, Columbia University.
1. See Rosett, CriticalReflections on the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the
International Sale of Goods, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 265, 274-77 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Critical Reflections]; Rosett, The International Sales Convention: A Dissenting View, 18
INT'L. LAw. 445 (1984); InternationalSale of Goods: HearingBefore Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 837 (1984) (testimony Arthur Rosett).

2. A number of years ago, the late Professor Addison Mueller offered a seminar
at the UCLA Law School with the late Professor Folke Schmidt, of the law faculty at
Uppsala University, that demonstrated the compensatory and ultimately harmonious

interrelatedness of apparently conflicting formal rules. Each professor selected five
factual situations which he believed were particularly problematic under his nation's
law of sales (the UCC and the Scandinavian Sale of Goods Act). Each seminar ses21 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 575 (1988)
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The emphasis the drafters of CISG place on finding a verbal
formula that everyone can agree on, even when that formula fails to confront and deal with the substantive issues that still divide legal regimes,
may well operate to lessen harmony. The common statements of rules
will be understood differently and inevitably will be applied differently.
CISG thus has bought unification as a paramount virtue at the expense
of the substance of the rules adopted. To buy agreement, the parties
often compromised on confused, incoherent, and sometimes regressive
rules. Since CISG is just one in a series of such conventions that UNCITRAL has on its agenda, we need to ask ourselves whether this accomplishment is worth the price.
Now that CISG is United States law, American lawyers must learn
how to deal with it in transactions when it applies. Lawyers with different roles in the system will be confronted with distinct choices. Judges
and arbitrators will have to interpret and apply the Convention in order
to decide cases. They will soon realize that the process of interpretation
appropriate for this text is significantly different from the interpretive
technique familiar to modern common lawyers approaching a statute or
code in their domestic system. Other lawyers, who serve as counselors,
will have to understand CISG from a somewhat different perspective to
give advice to clients in the course of sales transactions. Perhaps the
most avid group of lawyer-readers for this book is likely to be those
counselors lucky enough to have a client who sometimes engages in
international trade. These lawyers must decide whether to advise their
clients to draft their contracts in contemplation of being governed by
the Convention, or whether to opt out of CISG by including a specific
clause derogating from the Convention and choosing another law to
govern the agreement. This book is a praiseworthy success because it
has useful things to say to both legal advisors and adjudicators. I will
return to these audiences and their concerns, but first let me tell you a
little about the book itself.
It should be clear by now that this reviewer is not a great fan of the
Convention. Nevertheless, I also think that this book, written by many
of CISG's principal drafters, is admirable. This book consists of an article-by-article analysis of CISG by eighteen authors, each of whom writes
on an article or on a related group of articles. What will strike the
reader immediately is the stellar quality of the contributors. They come
from fourteen nations, most having been intimately involved in the
drafting of CISG and having represented their country at the confersion was divided between an exposition of the situation and a description by the
coparticipant of how the other system would analyze and resolve the same factual
situation. Typically, the two presentations would start off in opposite directions, but

somewhere in the analysis one would take a sharp left turn in direction while the
other analysis would take a sharp right, producing quite parallel approaches. In most
of the ten problems there would be a second similar shift to bring the two sides to the
same resting point at the end of the story. Viewed in isolation, the rules were obviously inconsistent. Viewed as a whole in the special context in which they operated,
however, the same rules were quite harmonious.
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ences that produced the Convention. The authors come from every
continent and every major legal system. Socialism, capitalism, developing countries, industrial powers, and NICs are all represented. This feature is the key to the book's single most useful aspect: it explains better
than any other single source how we got here, where the words of the
Convention come from, and how to trace its history through the frequently opaque and spotty travaux preparatoires that form CISG's legislative history.
The editors have imposed a rather rigid structure on the book, forcing each contributor to go through each section assigned to him and not
only explain its history and meaning, but elaborate on the problems it
poses. A reassuringly high percentage of the contributors rise to this
challenge and make a serious effort to see their brainchild, warts and all.
It is certainly a virtue that, unlike other official and unofficial documents
that have been written about CISG, this book is not a heavily partisan
sellingjob. These short essays make some otherwise incomprehensible
articles of the Convention understandable as an organic development
and as the end product of a tortured drafting process. After all, the
project that produced this Convention goes back to 1929. The sponsoring agency and many of the participating nations, not to mention most
of the individual delegates who completed the task, were unborn or
were just children at the outset of the project. This history, particularly
the tale of those crucial meetings of the 1970's during which many of the
crucial decisions were shaped, is only partially captured in the summary
reports of the sessions published at the time. Finding one's way through
United Nations documents is always a hassle, even with a depository
library at one's disposal. This book substantially mitigates that difficulty
by providing clear histories of each article with references to the travaux
preparatoire, but also goes substantially beyond them to direct the
reader to other sources few would find on their own. When the published sources are inadequate, the authors frequently tell the story from
their personal experience, showing the advantage of having history told
by the participants. The authors were there and can trace the development better than anyone can hope to work out from the published
sources.
I. Conventions and Kaleidoscopes
The presence of eighteen authors inevitably has a scattering effect.
Some authors deal with all or most of the Convention articles on a topic.
In several places, however, a different commentator comes in to deal
with one article between two articles discussed by another author.
There are obvious and frequently useful shifts in perspective as the book
moves from the work of one author to another. This Convention is not
the product of any single author or of a single coherent perspective.
Many of its provisions were cut and pasted from various codes around
the world. After the lawyer-experts got as far as they could with eclecticism, compromise, and fancy word-craft, the diplomats entered the
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game at the 1980 Vienna meetings. Behind closed doors they produced
a politically acceptable version of the more contentious provisions. The
obvious way to accomplish this goal is with a sentence that can mean
anything or nothing and therefore is not too objectionable to anyone.
Certainly a provision on interest that can gain acquiescence from
Islamic, socialist, and capitalist constituencies is bound to have rather
striking protean qualities.
The book thus provides a wonderful kaleidoscopic effect as a large
number of authors produce many little gems, each displaying many, if
not a thousand, points of light. Some of the most striking discussions
are only a few sentences long and few extend more than a page or two.
Authors treat a topic when they come to it in the setting of the article
they are discussing, yet often no cross-references are provided to the
other places in which the topic appears. This feature is not necessarily a
vice, but it places unsustainable burdens on the book index, for it is
inevitable that some of the best treatments of a point are not where the
3
CISG text would lead you to expect them.

II. Occasional Blindspots
The format sometimes leads to understandable blind spots, when it
appears that an author knows the story so well that he does not realize
that the rest of us weren't there and may need a fuller explanation of the
terms used. For example, the treatment of the essential jurisdictional
element of "place of business" in articles one and ten is unlikely to help
an American lawyer understand what is meant in practical terms,
because our law uses this term in a distinctly different connotation than
the commentary's author has in mind. Along the same lines, it is puzzling that the author of the commentary on article four, who is trained in
the common law, provides so little guidance on the meaning of the term
"validity of contract", a crucial aspect of the Convention. The term is
not to my knowledge often used in common law countries, and its mean3. A nine-page index is not adequate for an 850-page book organized this way.
For example, the discussion of contract validity under article four, where the term
appears in the CISG text, is very thin. Khoo, Questions to be Covered by the Convention, in
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw 44 (C. Bianca & M. Bonell eds.

1987). As I went to work on this review, I recalled that Professor Bonell, who did not
write the commentary on article four, did provide some very useful insights into the
concept of validity. I was chagrined to discover that this discussion is omitted from
the index, forcing me to leaf back through all of Bonell's articles until I found what I
was looking for under article seven. Bonell, Interpretation of the Convention, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW, supra at 65. Two other instances in which
I was unable to find a point in the index were Professor Eorsi's treatment of adver-

tisements as offers in article 14, Eorsi, Formation of the Contract, in COMMENTARY ON
supra at 135-36 and Professor Maskow's illuminating
discussion of the distinction in article 53 between taking delivery and making delivery. Maskow, Obligations of the Buyer, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW, supra at 383.

THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAw,
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ing is often quite indefinite. 4 Essentially, the term contract validity indicates those circumstances in which positive law displaces the parties'
contractual autonomy and imposes a legally defined rule on their relationship. In other words, it defines the scope of contract and the extent
to which national rules on such topics as legal capacity of the parties,
mistake, misunderstanding, fraud, unconscionability, usury, consumer
protection, compliance with socialist plan, and other forms of illegality
apply. Yet the book offers its readers little helpful guidance on how to
understand the Convention's bare terms in these specific situations.
The seriousness of this failing becomes manifest when one considers
that the most likely response to any substantial problem in commercial
law is some mandatory regulation dealing with it by legislative, judicial,
or administrative rule and that such responses usually affect contractual
validity.
The book's heavy structural emphasis on section-by-section analysis
results in little consideration of problems not addressed in the Convention text. For example, what is a "sale"? How does CISG work with
retained security interests, consignments, or leasing in general? Several
of the authors, most notably Professors Will and Maskow in their excellent parallel treatments of the articles on buyers' and sellers' remedies,
struggle heroically to provide some of the missing connective tissue.
They base their illustrations on specific and familiar transactions, connecting the CISG provision to comparable treatments of the same situation by major legal systems. Professor Maskow is particularly helpful
when discussing the relation between the general terms of buyer's obligations and the much used definitions of INCOTERMS and the socialist
CMEA General Conditions of Delivery of Goods. 5
Professor Farnsworth's discussion of article 19 dealing with modified acceptance, crossed orders and the battle of the forms also gives
6
useful illustrations that disclose the regressive nature of this article.
American law under the UCC Section 2-207, and international law as
embodied in article seven of the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts both conform to common business practice in recognizing that
parties may form a contract even if the specific terms of the communications they exchange are not consistent in all respects. While Professor
Farnsworth's discussion cannot cure the defects of a poorly conceived
provision, it will provide interpreters with real help around the
difficulties.
Unfortunately, other discussions treat the sales transaction in a
rather abstract fashion that leaves this reader uncertain regarding just
4. Heitz, Validity of Contracts Under the UNCISG and Swiss ContractLaw, 20
TRANSNAT'L.

VAND. J.

L. 639 (1987); Critical Reflections, supra note 1, at 280; Phillip,

Mandatory Rules, PublicLaw (PoliticalRules) and Choice of Law in the E.E.C. Convention on
the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS 81 (P. North ed.
1982).
5. Maskow, supra note 3, at 383-93.
6. Farnsworth, Modified Acceptance, in

LAW, supra note 3, at 175.
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what kind of transaction the author has in mind. It would have been
very helpful to have a single explanation of how this Convention will
affect typical international transactions, such as a CIF sale of standard
goods with payment by an irrevocable letter of credit against bill of lading and insurance certificate.
To some extent the absence of such an explanation is a direct result
of the inability of the drafters of CISG to agree on the appropriate role
of such trade usage, customs, and definitions. Professor Bonell
describes these problems in his treatment of article nine and candidly
regrets the failure to include in CISG a provision regarding trade definitions similar to that which existed under ULIS, the older sales convention. 7 This omission from CISG creates uncertainty whether CISG is
consistent with continued use of these transactions. Perhaps parties
must derogate from CISG and choose another law to avoid, for example, having CISG's novel rights of the buyer to inspect and examine the
goods under articles 38 and 58(3) applied in mischievous ways to a CIF
documentary sale. Professor Maskow's treatment of this specific issue is
very reassuring, but I understand him to assume that CISG would honor
the parties' choice of trade definitions or the Uniform Customs and
Practice for Documentary Credits.8 My hope that his interpretation is
correct is somewhat shadowed by Professor Bonell's discussion of articles six and nine. In article six, Bonell states quite emphatically that it is
insufficient for parties to choose a standard set of contract terms and
conditions unless they explicitly exclude the application of the Convention. 9 In article nine Bonell outlines CISG's unfortunate and unreceptive treatment of trade definitions and other forms of customs and usage
under CISG. 10 This suggests that it will not be enough to use the familiar trade definitions with a reference to their source if a drafting lawyer
wants to avoid the potential superimposition of the inconsistent CISG
provisions.

M. Coolness of Tone
Obviously, those who created the Convention in general approve of it.
It is a great strength of this book that its authors are able to examine
critically their handiwork in a balanced way. What is somewhat surprising is that even after making allowance for the rather abstract tone that
is common in scholarly writing, there remains throughout this book a
notable coolness toward the substance of the Convention. This coolness
permeates most of the authors' assessments. The tone is set by Professor Bonell in his introductory section, where a few opening pages of
7. Bonell, Art. 9- Usages and Practices, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
supra note 3, at 114.
8. Maskow, Art. 58- Time of Payment, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAw, supra note 3, at 424-30.
9. Bonell, Art. 6- Parties'Autonomy, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAw, supra note 3, at 56-57.
10. Bonell, supra note 7, at 104-06.
SALES LAw,
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basic history of the Convention are followed by a short essay in two sections entitled "Meaning and Purpose of the Convention" and
"Problems Concerning the Convention". What is remarkable is the
degree to which this essay is responsive and defensive in structure. Professor Bonell first points out that there have been criticisms of the drafters' decision to limit the ambit of the Convention to "international
relationships" and criticism of how such relationships are defined. It
appears that Professor Bonell is defending the Convention from some
unnamed and unquoted critics. The tone is one familiar to every advocate; it is the voice of confession and avoidance. It recognizes faults,
admits imperfections, concedes shortcomings, and suggests the moderate hope that the advantages outweigh the flaws.
This responsive emphasis dominates throughout the book, leading
one to ask what in the nature of this project causes so many of its drafters to appear so uneasy with the content of their own product. Those
who have labored for years to bring forth a major piece of work know
the feeling of post-partum depression that can come after it is too late to
give the galley proofs one more correcting edit, but it is surprising to
find that so few of the more than one hundred articles in this book strike
an enthusiastic note regarding the substance of the Convention. In some
cases this Convention represents the investment of literally decades of
the authors' time, yet where are the discussions that in effect say something like, "This is a very clever and well drafted provision that significantly clarifies and rectifies prior law and will improve the ease and
fairness of commercial transactions"?
IV.

Law Unification and Law Improvement

Aside from law unification, the authors suggest few substantive policies
that CISG advances. In those relatively rare instances when an author
mentions an instrumental goal of law reform, he is likely to drop it
quickly, without providing any compelling demonstration that the Convention text serves the stated end. For example, in the first paragraph of
the introduction, Professor Bonell describes the need to "provide rules
governing the international sale of goods which, apart from being uniform, also take into account the fact that export or import transactions
are often entered into by parties who do not possess equal bargaining
power and who operate in quite different socio-economic contexts." 11
This is a commendable goal that may help explain the reference in the
Preamble of the Convention to "the broad objectives in the resolutions
adopted by the sixth special session of the General Assembly of the
United Nations on the establishment of a New International Economic
11. Bonel, Introduction to the Convention, in
supra note 3, at I.

SALES LAw,
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Order." Unfortunately, this idea does not surface again. 12 Where are
the provisions that are designed to advantage weaker parties? How can
the Convention claim to be sensitive to the need for such protection and
at the same time allow parties to derogate freely from its provisions? 13
How can the Convention be said to be intended to redress the balance
between the strong and the weak in the marketplace if it removes from
its ambit all matters of validity, that is, those that are the subject of
mandatory rules and therefore outside of the contractual autonomy of
the parties? The single greatest weakness of contract as a tool of social
organization is that it almost always tends to aggravate the power inequalities between the parties, advantaging the stronger and more
sophisticated when they deal with the weaker. Bargaining always tends
to favor the strong, the informed, and the quick. That is the primary
reason why social intervention is needed to declare that some kinds of
deals are invalid. How are these problems, which are inherent in all
legal systems based on personal autonomy and consent, different in
international transactions than they are in domestic sales law?
The book's introduction anticipates this criticism:
Still less convincing appears the view according to which the new uniform
law is inspired by schemes or principles that are outdated or at least not
corresponding to the effective needs of international trade. One must
bear in mind that elaborating an international Convention is something
quite different from proposing a model law. While in the latter case, one
can look exclusively to the most advanced solutions, in the former one
must take into account all the different positions that States take on the
merits of the questions under consideration. Hence the necessity for compromise solutions that by their nature will be less valuable from a strictly
technical standpoint, but at least present the advantage of rendering the
uniform rules acceptable to all States. Notwithstanding this, there are a
number of fairly innovative provisions in the present Convention...14
The problem is not that CISG is not a model law. Rather, the central fault is that it is hard to detect a systematic set of values of any kind
at work here. This is going to make interpretation of CISG very difficult,
since its language is loose and does not emerge from a shared defining
legal culture. Yet the authors urge interpreters to treat the Convention
12. The discussion of the preamble by Professor Evans barely mentions the
NIECO reference, and the rest of the articles in the book do not tell us further how
the Convention serves this lofty purpose.
13. The discussion of article six recognizes that the economically stronger party
can abuse the principle of party autonomy in practice, but does not attempt to reconcile the Convention's adoption of unlimited autonomy with its other stated values.
Bonell, supra note 11, at 51-52.
14. Id. at 13. The discussion goes on to catalogue these innovations for common
law systems, including: the elimination of the Statute of Frauds; the elimination of
the doctrine of consideration for promises not to revoke an offer or to modify a contract; and the distinction between "conditions" and "warranties." The innovations
noted for civil law systems are the elimination of fault as an element of damages and
the requirement that avoidance be preceded by notice. No items on this list will contribute materially to solving problems traceable to inequality of bargaining power.
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as a code, to avoid interpreting it the way they interpret national law,

and to reason analogically in arriving at a solution to specific problems.
V.

Codification and Harmonization

The book's structured organization seems to have left the authors little
opportunity to step back and take an overall look at the process of international codification by consensus that led to CISG and is likely to produce a number of other conventions in the years ahead. None of the
authors takes the occasion to share his insights and experiences with the
process of codification used by UNCITRAL or on the uses and limits of
a convention like CISG as a tool of harmonization in commercial law. I
wish that more attention had been devoted to discussion of this process.
In this century commercial law has become codified throughout the
world in national legal systems that otherwise are very different. Two
centuries ago and beyond such codes were relatively uncommon. In
those earlier times the harmony of international commercial practice
was embodied in a kind of common law merchant in the western world,
and by trade customs that mitigated the hostility that dominated dealings with the other civilizations with which Europeans traded. Now
codes are found everywhere and are the expected form for stating the
law. In the discussion of interpretation under article seven of the Convention, Professor Bonell recognizes that codes are understood as very
different things in different legal systems, and that Europeans and common lawyers approach the interpretive task differently because of their
divergent understanding of what a code is all about. 15
The term "code" may describe very different documents. Some
"codes" are simply compilations of statutes enacted over time, while
others start primarily as teaching materials; only a few claim to be systematically exclusive and definitive statements of the law.1 6 From time
to time, most legal systems feel the need to collect, revise, and rationalize the rules on a subject that have grown up. These kinds of compilations can be seen in the Biblical Codes, the Revised Statutes, or in most
titles of the United States Code. A compilation code is likely not to display notable textual coherence; its acceptability flows from the degree to
which it embodies shared experience or that it is believed to contain the
command of an indisputable authority. Other varieties of code start out
with an educational or explicit law reform function. They seek not only
to collect the law, but to rationalize it, to make it more consistent with
stated values, or to improve it. Compiling, explaining, teaching, and
reforming the law are closely related goals. All are likely to contribute
to a codification, and it sometimes is hard to characterize one aspect as
dominant in a single code. Looking back over time it may be hard to tell
what the original intention of the creators was. Scholars continue to
debate the extent to which the authors of the Mishnah or Justinian set
15. Bonell, supra note 3, at 72-80.
16. E. DORFF & A. Ros=r, A LIVING TREE, 366-76 (1988).
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out to write a code and the extent that the work originally was intended
as a text for students. In any event, over the centuries these texts have
become the authoritative statement of the law because "that's the way I
was taught it when I started to study law." To take a more modem
example, the leaders of the American Law Institute have long debated
whether their Restatements should simply compile and edit the common
law, or whether they are to rationalize it and seek the "better rule." The
Institute has been promulgating restatements for over half a century
now but the issue seems to arise again with each new project.
Only rarely in history has any society agreed sufficiently on values to
make possible a third kind of code, which is engendered by a generally
shared faith in the capacity of systematics to capture the essence of reality. At such a time it will seem possible to state in simple, clear terms the
crucial propositions upon which the whole world hangs, and then to
deduct logically from those axioms the correct resolution of concrete
problems. Europe was swept by such faith during the 17-19th centuries
as Enlightenment and rationalism took legal form in this third kind of
code. The French and German Civil Codes were grounded on the claim
that their lucid general propositions provided a rational basis to arrive
logically at good rules to govern specific disputes. Such a code is the
sum of the law in the sense that it contains the central core of principles
from which specific rules for concrete situations could, it is thought, be
derived. As time has passed and these codes have been transported
around the world to very different cultures, this faith appears to have
been diluted, but it lives on as an assumption in hearts of many civil
lawyers.
My point is that to write a code you either have to have a large fund
of shared experience (the compilation), or a high degree of certainty
regarding shared values (the Civil Codes), or unquestioning confidence
in the authority of the law-giver (Signs and Wonders). The very different experiences with imported European Civil Codes in Japan and China
during the past century exemplify how hard it can be to borrow a code
unless at least one of these conditions is satisfied. China's efforts to borrow a code have yet to take root firmly, while Japan has made its borrowed codes work only by creating a whole new language to express the
foreign concepts and then slowly providing the new terms with referents
17
in the underlying national experience.
During the past half-century, the center of gravity for international
law unification has shifted from such agencies as UNIDROIT and the
Hague Conferences to UNCITRAL. The shift is more than organizational. The highly Eurocentric roots of this project have been squeezed
as membership in the drafting bodies has expanded many fold to admit
representatives of less developed, socialist, Islamic and other legal
regimes. Diversity enriches social processes, often by complicating
17. Ramseyer, Water Law in ImperialJapan: Public Goods, Private Claims and Legal
Convergence, 18J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1989).
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them. In this case, the inclusion of many new voices has certainly made
it more difficult to reach any agreement on the contentious issues of
sales law. CISG is the inevitable product of compromise without basic
agreement. Instead of compromise purchased by one side giving way on
one set of issues and the other side conceding on the next, the CISG
negotiators searched for a sufficiently broad formulation to encompass
both views. The result, of course, is that CISG says nothing about the
issues people are going to fight about, 18 and has nothing new and substantive to say about the issues that do cause disputes. A law built that
way will not resolve many troubling cases.
Unfortunately, CISG lacks any of these preconditions for successful
codification. The group that promulgates it does not share a large body
of experience to compile, the drafters lack essential agreement on values
and priorities regarding contentious questions and no one has much
confidence in the authority of the law giving agency. When this project
began over a half century ago, its aim was to bring together the divergent strands of the civil law that had developed in Continental European
capitalist nations under the influence of industrial development. The
differences were perceived by the sponsors as substantial, particularly
when they contemplated including either the Scandinavians or the ideosyncratic English in the project, but they seem quite small when compared to the drastically different conditions that pertained to large
segments of humanity that were not participants. Until the project
ground to a halt as a result of the political and ideological disasters that
culminated in a catastrophic war, it seemed reasonable to expect that the
group could agree on sensible rules based on their shared cultural and
economic experience. What basis is there for reaching such consensus
today?
Do not understand my doubts about the feasibility of world codification as doubt about the reality of harmonization of commercial and
legal practice. The unification of practice has already gone very far and
seems to be accelerating. My point is that harmonization of practice
precedes unification through formal statements of norms. People are
very adept at finding ways to do business together. Only gradually do
these accommodations, which in the beginning often are seen as deviance, work their way into acceptance as the correct way of doing things,
and then fully become part of the formal statements of law. Typically,
the last stage in this process is the discovery of an overarching value
system that explains and legitimates the practice. Holmes taught us that
law and experience interact, but it is not only in the common law that
durable law is more likely to grow out of experience than business practice is to conform happily to the demands of lawmakers.
18. For example, CISG lavishes great attention on the details of contract formation, which to my knowledge does not give rise to many real world disputes anywhere. One exception is the subject of modified acceptance and crossed orders
where the Convention moves backwards from the prior position of both American
and international law. See Farnsworth, supra note 6 and accompanying text.

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal

Vol. 21

This book represents a belated step in the direction of recognizing
that the Convention is part of such an ongoing process, rather than an
eternal monument. The text of CISG suffers because its drafters appear
to have conceived it as having an existence outside of time. Many of its
key provisions have no visible past and the text makes no provision for
correction, improvement, or change. Professor Bonnell's discussion of
article seven provides an excellent short survey of the devices that other
international conventions have incorporated to serve this purpose. 19 A
functional code must anticipate, deal with, and incorporate into its core
structure some provision anticipating the time when the legitimating circumstances (shared community experience, value certainty, or authority) pass and a new code or new ideas must take their place.
VI.

Where Do We Go From Here?

Putting all the pieces together, what can a judge or lawyer who must
interpret CISG draw from this book?
A. Treat CISG as a Code
Do not treat CISG as a tightly drawn statute. This law is not like the
Internal Revenue Code (but then again, neither is the Uniform Commercial Code). It is intended more often as a general statement of principles that can be applied and extended analogically. There usually is
no point in parsing each word for a precision that is not there. American courts should have no trouble shucking the last vestiges of plain
meaning and the traditional narrow English style of statutory interpretation. 20 The text of the Convention invites interpretation in light of "its
international character," to promote "the observance of good faith in
international trade," and to assist "the development of trade on the
basis of equality, and mutual benefit" in order to advance "friendly relations among States." '2 1 Certainly that mandate is sufficiently broad to
allow an interpreter to choose an approach to the text that produces the
sensible, fair, or reasonable result. Of course those lawyers who must
counsel clients are confronted with the flip side of the interpreter's
broad mandate. Judges and arbitrators have a wonderful canvas upon
which to project their views, but the risk-adverse counselor will find little
comfort in the capacity of the Convention's text to contain diverse
meanings.
19. Bonell, supra note 3, at 88-93; see also Critical Reflections, supra note 1, at 29399.
20. American lawyers would do well to study carefully the heated debates
reflected in English case law over the past decade as English courts have had to confront a growing body of European law and international conventions with multiple
authoritative versions in many languages. See, e.g., ReJahre v. The Norwegian State,
Court of Appeal (Civil Div.) 18 Dec. 1987 (unpublished); Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., [1981] A.C. 251 (1980);James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding
and Shipping (UK) Ltd., [1978] A.C. 141, (1977). For a recent Supreme Court treatment of this issue see Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985).
21. CISG, at article seven and preamble.
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B.

Be Aware of Limits of the Text, Legislative History, and Other
Guides
In a masterful four-page discussion Professor Bonell catalogues some of
the inherent limits an interpreter will encounter in dealing with the
text. 22 He suggests that the interpreter check ambiguities and obscurities against all six equally authentic language versions. The connotations of the text are likely to differ significantly in different languages,
providing the interpreter with a potentially welcome choice if he or she
is a judge or arbitrator and with a potentially insoluble problem if he or
she is a counselor. 23 Of course, to use this option the interpreter must
know, or have access to the services of someone familiar with legal
vocabulary and usage in Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and
Spanish. Those of us who are a bit rusty in one or more of these
tongues will find it difficult to take advantage of this suggestion. Professor Bonell then suggests we check the legislative history, but do not be
too disappointed if that history is absent or reveals that there were differences in opinion among the drafters themselves as to what their
handiwork means. Next, look to interpretations of the provision in
other countries. This, too, may be difficult because in many countries
judicial opinions are not widely disseminated or published. Professor
Bonell expresses the hope that UNICTRAL will develop a procedure for
the deposit of decisions with its Secretariat, who then would publish a
summary in all the official languages of the UN. He recognizes that it is
unclear what an interpreting judge is to do with a scattering of short
summaries of divergent solutions from isolated courts of first instance.
Finally, Professor Bonell explicitly rejects two solutions. An interpreting judge should not adopt a "national" solution, that is, the judge
should not treat the provision as he or she would understand a similarly
worded provision of domestic law. Second, although parties may freely
exclude the application of the Convention by agreement, Professor
Bonell rejects the possibility that they can agree that the rules of interpretation used with respect to ordinary domestic legislation shall apply
to it. He fears that approach might undermine worldwide uniformity in
the law.
22. See Bonell, supra note 3, at 90-94.
23. Difference in connotation and translation are familiar tools for diplomatic

negotiators trying to reach an agreement on sensitive points when the parties really
do not agree. These techniques are functional when applied to agreements dealing
with broad issues of international politics and public law, such as the Anti-Ballistic

Missile Treaty or the Shanghai Communique between China and the United States.
The technique can only be mischievous in the context of a private law agreement that
must be interpreted by private parties unrelated to the negotiators. The Secretary of

the UNCITRAL Working Group on the International Sale of Goods and a legal
officer serving the Working Group provide eloquent testimony of the problems of
translation and multilingual multinational conventions. Bersten & Miller, The Remedy
of Reduction of Price, 27 AM.J. ComP. L. 255, 276 (1979).
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Think Transactionally

Interpreters should apply articles of CISG transactionally and contextually, not word-by-word. Parties to international sales rarely make up the
form of transaction as they go along. There are well-worn paths
through the forest, and most traders intend to stick to the road.
Although the text of CISG does not always display awareness of these
transaction types, particularly in some of its more obscure articles, the
interpreter will be doing everyone a great service if he or she understands the Convention text as if it were designed to enable parties to
continue to do what they have been doing so well for centuries. If confronting a CIF contract, treat inspection and excuse terms as they are
treated in INCOTERMS or other universally recognized definitions of
such a transaction. This strategy will enable the interpreter to supply
the missing links not provided by the drafters of the Convention. It will
enable interpreters to breathe coherence into the text that the drafters
probably wished for but, unfortunately, did not provide us. It also will
enable the text to be understood in a way that will best comply with that
essential guide for all contracts, the intention of the parties. It is generally safe to assume that the parties made their agreement against the
background of commercial practice. Interpreting the Convention in
ways that are consistent with that practice will fulfill that intention. At
the same time, counselors will have to be cautious because, as was discussed earlier, the drafters of CISG made a very clear decision not to
include provisions on trade definitions and custom that would embody
this approach.
D.

Opt Out If You Can

Article six, which recognizes the parties' autonomy to exclude the application of the Convention or derogate or vary the effect of its provisions,
compensates to some extent for the foregoing interpretive difficulties.
In light of the uncertainties and novelty of CISG, most counsel for
sophisticated trading clients probably will advise them to avoid the risks
of the unknown by electing to derogate from CISG and negotiating a
choice of law clause that will provide a more congenial body of rules.
The major exception would be those situations when, for political reasons, choice of law is not negotiable, or when the likely choice that
would emerge from negotiation is an even more exotic or dubious body
of law. This might be the case in transactions with some less developed
countries or when the American party for some reason does not have
enough negotiating leverage to choose familiar law. Until the matter is
settled by judicial decisions, drafters would be wise to take Professor
Bonell's advice and explicitly exclude CISG whenever they choose
another body of law. 2 4 This interpretation of article six, which deals
with party autonomy to derogate from the Convention and choose
another law, seems dreadfully formalistic and operates only to lay a
24. See Bonell, supra note 9, at 56-57.
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snare for the unwary, but in light of the Convention text the advice is
prudent.
E.

Arbitrate

Clarifying interpretations of this Convention will accumulate only slowly
because sales contract disputes will not appear in courts very often. The
reason why lawsuits are infrequent in this field is that most traders long
have preferred arbitration of commercial disputes. The adoption of
CISG is unlikely to weaken that preference. One obvious advantage for
commercial parties to arbitration is that the arbitrator usually is free of
appellate review or criticism if he or she reads the law broadly, contextually, and differently than a judge would. Ironically, a significant fringe
benefit of the adoption of CISG is that, to avoid judicial application of
CISG's troublesome aspects drafters may now be more inclined to provide expansive arbitration clauses.
F. Please Don't Do It Again
It would be very helpful if all UNCITRAL delegates read this book and
meditate upon its lessons for their future work. We should not fault the
drafters of CISG for their inability to arrive at a Continental style code
that concisely and clearly states universal principles of sales law. The
sixty eight nations that participate in UNCITRAL are incapable of any
such agreement. I fault the pretense that there are grand principles at
work and transcendent values being vindicated. In fact, the Convention
is largely a cut-and-paste job, and the primary operative drafting principle was to produce a document that all could agree to and none would
reject. I do wish that the drafters had seen their task more realistically as
of one of building from transaction and practice to principle. That is the
essence of my criticism of CISG's treatment of custom and trade usage
as well as it's lack of a clear transactional perspective. More crucially, I
wish that they had shown greater realization that the process upon which
they had embarked is an organic, continuing one. It simply is not necessary to float a convention text with no attention to the need for revision,
correction and interpretation. What we need are Conventions more
sensitive to the need to incorporate the capacity for change, growth and
discovery into the process of harmonization.

